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HOW CAN IT BE WRONG WHEN IT FEELS SO RIGHT? APPELLATE
REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS UNDER THE SECURITIES
LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is widespread judicial confusion regarding reviewability of remand orders. 1 The addition of the specialized removal and remand provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA") created an inevitable circuit split.2 It took only a year for the
core securities litigation circuits to form a sharp divide over whether an
appellate court may review a district court's remand order under SLUSA.3
The controversy over the issue reflects the dynamic nature of securities
litigation, an area in which strong opinions exist and Congress is often

pressured to

act.

4

In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA") to prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits. 5 The
PSLRA attempted to filter out meritless securities class actions, known as
"strike suits," through stringent pleading requirements and discovery
1. See In reAmoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992)
("'Straightforward' is about the last word judges attach to § 1447(d) these days
").For
.. a discussion of the bar on appellate review in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), see
infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
2. For a discussion of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998's ("SLUSA") specialized review and remand provisions, see infra notes
108-22 and accompanying text.
3. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116,
122 (2d Cir. 2003) (presenting threshold question of reviewability for remand orders). The Second Circuit decided against review in 2003. See id. at 121. The
Ninth Circuit decided against review in 2004. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit permitted review in 2004. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850-51
(7th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging creation of circuit split); see also PRIcEwATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2003 Securities Litigation Study, at 7, available at http://www.10b5.com/
2003_study.pdf (illustrating number of securities class action lawsuits by circuit)
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004). For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes
123-62 and accompanying text.
4. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: FederalPreemption of State
SecuritiesFraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 32 (1998) (describing nature
of debate in securities litigation). "In the securities arena, this debate often escalates into a 'battle,' as plaintiff's lawyers accuse issuers, underwriters, and accountants of pervasive fraud, and they, in turn, charge plaintiffs' lawyers with greed and
opportunism." Id. These strong interest groups influence the legislative process
through large amounts of money. See id. (describing how Congress is influenced).
5. See H.R. CONr. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (providing congressional

intent for Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")); see also Michael
Brown, Stop "Strike Suits" Before They Strike Again, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1998, at A18
(discussing passage of PSLRA over President Clinton's veto). For a discussion of
the PSLRA, see infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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stays. 6 In response, plaintiffs began using the "federal flight" loophole by
filing in state court to avoid the procedural reforms of the PSLRA. 7 The
ability of plaintiffs to evade the PSLRA's reach in this manner drove Congress to enact SLUSA.8
In an effort to close the federal flight loophole, Congress preempted
certain types of state securities class actions by making federal court the
exclusive venue. 9 To effectuate this purpose, SLUSA permits a defendant
to remove a state action to federal court and assert preemption. 10 Now,
district courts determine if a state action is preempted by applying a fourpart test derived from SLUSA's preemption provision.1 1 If SLUSA preemption is inapplicable, the district judge is required to remand the action to state court.

12

13
There are arguments to support appellate review of remand orders.
14
Decisions regarding SLUSA preemption have been "all over the map."
Despite Congress's efforts to end strike suits, securities class actions are

6. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998)

(explaining problem of

strike suits in securities litigation). These "strike suits" were designed to "extract a

sizeable settlement from companies that are forced to settle, regardless of the lack
of merits" to avoid expensive litigation. Id. Many of the procedural reforms of the
PSLRA were designed to curb the abuses inherent in strike suits. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (setting forth intent for heightened pleading standard); id.
at 47 (discussing stay of discovery provision).
7. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (recognizing "'substitution effect'
whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid the new, more stringent requirements of federal cases").
8. See id. at 13 (stating purpose of SLUSA "is to prevent plaintiffs from seeking
to evade" reforms of PSLRA).
9. See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir.
2001) (noting SLUSA closed loophole by making federal court exclusive venue for
certain securities actions).
10. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2004) (setting forth
SLUSA's removal provision); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f) (2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f)(2) (2004) (same); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(b) (setting forth SLUSA's preemption provision); Securities Act of 1934
§ 28(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (same). For a full discussion of SLUSA's removal and preemption provisions, see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
11. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1342 (11 th Cir. 2002) (stating four-part test for removal); Shaw v. Charles Schwab
& Co., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("SLUSA requires that the
removing party demonstrate [the four-part test] . . ").
12. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4) (requiring
remand if action can be maintained in state court); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 28(f) (3) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (3) (D) (same).
13. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004) (expressing need for appellate review of remand orders).
14. See Magyery v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 954, 959
(N.D. Ind. 2004) (noting SLUSA preemption confuses district courts); Jennifer
O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct: If It Looks Like
a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud
Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REv. (forthcoming Jan. 2005) (manuscript at 2, on file with
author) (recognizing courts' inconsistencies in applying SLUSA preemption).
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15
Thus,
being filed at a continuous rate in both federal and state courts.
will grow in imjudicial interpretation of SLUSA's preemption provision
16
portance as securities litigation continues to expand.

Although appellate review of remand orders makes practical sense,
17
Congress
the strongly worded 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars appellate review.
8
Nevertheenacted § 1447(d) to prevent delays in securities litigation.'
19
The
less, a number of exceptions have been created to permit review.
in § 1447(d) and
best approach is to respect the limitations 2established
0
bar review of remand orders under SLUSA.
The purpose of this Note is to reconcile the need for consistent and
accurate application of SLUSA preemption with the strong statutory bar
21
Part II of this Note first details the proceon review of remand orders.
15. Compare Lingling Wei, Many Companies Were Sued by Shareholders in '02,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at D3 (noting PSLRA did not "slow the pace" of securities litigation), with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, Securities Class Action Case Filings 2003:
A Year in Review, at 3, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-re
search/2003 YIR/2003051104.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) ("Interestingly, each
of the past three years [2001-2003] has seen a new type of class action filing."),
and PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 3 (detailing evidence that number
of securities class actions has increased since PSLRA enacted). There was a rise in
initial public offering ("IPO") suits in 2001, 2002 was the year for filings against
analysts and recently a series of actions against mutual funds have been filed. See
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra (illustrating IPO allocation filings against brokerage firms alleging "laddering"). Laddering was a common practice during the
tech boom where "certain investors promised to buy additional shares of new issues at progressively higher prices, kicking back a percentage of the profits they
made on the hottest issues by rewarding brokerage firms with additional business."
Henry Sender, Deals & Deal Makers: Securities Suits Hit Record Total of 483 in 2001,
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at C5. The analyst suits alleged their reports were
neither independent nor objective. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra, at 17 (commenting on suits against sell-side analyst firms for recommending price targets
with no factual basis). Finally, mutual fund actions include claims alleging a failure to disclose special treatment of preferred clients to take advantage of market
timing gains. See id. (acknowledging that mutual fund securities lawsuits increased
at end of 2003).

16. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (commenting that SLUSA preemption is major
issue in course of litigation).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2004) (barring appellate review of remand orders). For a discussion of the bar on appellate review, see infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
18. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 354-55
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating limitations on review of remand orders
was for purpose of preventing delay).
19. For a discussion of the exceptions to § 1447(d), see infra notes 53-96 and
accompanying text.
20. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116,
128 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating appellate review would contravene "strong" congressional policy). But see Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (noting that appellate review of remand orders "makes practical sense too").
21. For a conclusion on how to permit appellate review without eviscerating
§ 1447(d), see infra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
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dural framework for removal and remand; 2 2 it then highlights the history
of the bar on appellate review and its exceptions. 23 Part III presents the
federal securities structure, with particular focus on SLUSA's removal and
remand provisions. 24 Part TV discusses the circuit split regarding appellate
review of remand orders under SLUSA.2 5 Part V analyzes that issue and
concludes that appellate review is barred by § 1447(d). 2 6 Part V also discusses the need for review of SLUSA preemption to ensure consistency
and accuracy, but finds this need is satisfied by cases that reach appellate
courts following dismissal based on SLUSA preemption. 27 Finally, Part VI
sets out brief conclusions on the reviewability of remand orders under
28
SLUSA.
II.

FEDERAL PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK

Jurisdiction refers to the "classes of cases (subject matter jurisdiction)
and persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority. ' 29 Federal courts are limited in their subject matter jurisdiction
22. For an outline of the procedural history with a focus on removal and remand, see infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the bar on appellate review and the judicially created
exceptions, see infra notes 48-96 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the securities framework relevant to this Note, see infra
note 97-122 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the courts' holdings and the resulting circuit split, see
infra notes 123-62 and accompanying text.
26. For an analysis of the appellate review issue, see infra notes 163-207 and
accompanying text.
27. For recognition of the need for review of SLUSA preemption and a finding that the need is satisfied, see infra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
28. For brief conclusions on the analysis in this Note, see infra notes 228-35
and accompanying text.
29. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (noting term "jurisdiction"
is often misused and clarifying use of term). In Kontrick, the Supreme Court rejected a debtor's defense that the creditor untimely filed an amended complaint
because the debtor failed to raise the defense until after the complaint was adjudicated on the merits. See id. at 446-47 (noting procedural history and affirming
circuit court's holding). The debtor claimed that the time limit defense was jurisdictional and not subject to waiver. See id. at 455-56 (discussing debtor's jurisdictional arguments). The Court, however, held that complaint-filing time
instructions were not jurisdictional. See id. at 447 (finding debtor's jurisdiction
argument invalid). Therefore, the debtor waived the defense of untimeliness by
not timely raising it before adjudication on the merits. See id. at 456 (holding
"claim-processing rule ... can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the
rule waits too long to raise the point"); see also Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S. Ct.
1856, 1864-65 (2004) (reiterating Kontrick emphasis that claim processing rules
are notjurisdictional). "Courts, including this Court.... have more than occasionally [mis]used the term jurisdictional' to describe emphatic time prescriptions in
[claim processing] rules .......
Id. at 1865 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454)
(alterations in original). In Scarborough, the Court held that a thirty-day time limitation rule does not define the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
for Veteran Claims. See id. (stating time limit rule applies only to "postjudgment
proceedings auxiliary to cases already within the court's adjudicatory authority").
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by the United States Constitution and federal statutes, whereas state courts
have general subject matter jurisdiction and can hear nearly any cognizable claim. 3 0 In the event of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and
state courts, the plaintiff may choose the forum based on practical and
31
strategic considerations.
A.

Removal in General

Despite the ability of the plaintiff to choose the forum, removal stat32
For
utes provide the defendant with some control over forum selection.
have
original
must
court
the
federal
the defendant to remove the action,
jurisdiction over the matter. 33 Federal courts often narrowly construe the
34
First, federal courts are hesidefendant's removal rights for two reasons.
infringe on powers the Conand
tant to overstep their limited jurisdiction
3 5
courts want to avoid the
federal
Second,
stitution leaves to state courts.
if removal jurisdicthe
plaintiff
to
unfairness
potential inexpediency and
36
improper.
found
is
tion
30. See ERWIN CHEMERINSK , FEDERALJURISDICTION 259 (4th ed. 2003) (discuss-

ing jurisdiction of federal and state courts). Article III of the United States Constitution sets forth federal question jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1
(setting forth scope of jurisdiction of federal courts).
31. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 262 (explaining notion of "concurrent
jurisdiction" between state and federal courts and plaintiffs' power to choose forum); see also RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 191
(3d ed. 2001) (discussing plaintiffs' power to choose forum when concurrent jurisdiction exists).
32. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 343 (noting "defendants may invoke
federal court jurisdiction by removing a case from state to federal court"). The
statutory provisions that authorize removal can be found in Title 28 of the United
States Code at Sections 1441 through 1452. See Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias
Against Remova4 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 635 (2004) (outlining procedural framework for removal jurisdiction).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2004) (detailing jurisdictional grounds for removal). "[A] ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have originaljurisdiction,may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants ...." Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Haiber, supra note 32, at 636 ("[M]ost federal courts agree about the
overall philosophy that applies to removal: a defendant's right to remove must be
limited wherever and whenever possible.").
35. See id. at 638 (presenting federalism as ground for "restricting the defendant's right to remove to federal court"); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal court, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
defined." (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934))).
36. See 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3721, at 351 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing plaintiff's right to choose forum and
threat of "the possibility that he will win a final judgment in federal court, only to
have it determined that the court lacked a proper basis for removal jurisdiction
requiring him to return to state court").
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There are three procedural areas that courts and Congress use to
manage a defendant's ability to remove an action to federal court. 3 7 The

first is the well-pleaded complaint rule, which prevents a defendant from
removing a case solely on the basis of a federal defense. 8 The rule enables the plaintiff, as "master of the complaint," to avoid removal jurisdiction by relying only on state law.39 The second procedural area is an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule known as the complete preemption doctrine. 40 This doctrine permits the removal of a state action
based purely on state law to federal court. 4 1 Complete preemption is triggered when a district court determines that a federal statute's preemptive
force is so extraordinary that only a federal claim exists. 4 2 Finally, Con-

gress has created numerous specialized removal provisions, which allow a
defendant to remove an action to federal court despite the restrictions of
the well-pleaded complaint rule. 4 3 These specialized provisions are rare
37. For a discussion of the three procedural areas, see infra notes 38-44 and
accompanying text.
38. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (discussing wellpleaded complaint rule, "which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when
a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint") (citation omitted); id. at 393 (explaining well-pleaded complaint rule's
limitation on removal by defendant); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63
(1987) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,
9-12 (1983)) ("The 'well-pleaded complaint rule' is the basic principle marking
the boundaries of the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts.").
39. See Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 392 (describing ability of "master of claim" to
avoid federal jurisdiction by reliance on state law).
40. See id. at 393 (noting "independent corollary" to the well-pleaded complaint rule).
41. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64 (noting defendant may remove
state action with complete preemption doctrine); see also 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 36, § 3722.1, at 511 (distinguishing complete preemption from ordinary preemption). "Ordinary preemption will not, however, permit removal jurisdiction if
the plaintiff chooses to frame his claim based solely on state law .... " Id.
42. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64 ("Congress may so completely
pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of
claims is necessarily federal in character."). It should be noted that the doctrine is
rarely applied by courts because of federalism implications. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 36, § 3722.1, at 517 (discussing limited application of complete preemption doctrine). One commentator notes that only two areas of complete preemption exist: actions under the Labor Management Relations Act and actions under
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See id. (detailing limited areas
of complete preemption). Recently, a third area has been subject to complete
preemption, actions under the National Bank Act. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v.
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (holding National Bank Act provides exclusive
federal cause of action for usury claims against national banks and state law claims
are completely preempted).
43. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2004) (authorizing removal of state actions
against federal officers); 28 U.S.C. § 1444 (2004) (providing for removal of quiet
title or foreclosure actions against United States). Specialized removal provisions
are listed in Title 28 and other provisions of the United States Code. See 14B
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 3729, at 195 (presenting removal proceedings
under other statutes providing for or prohibiting removal); see, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a (1) (3) (A) (2004) (allowing Resolution Trust Corporation to remove ac-
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exceptions to the general bias against removal, and they exhibit Congress's strong belief that certain matters should be handled in federal
court.

44

B.

Remand in General

Once an action is removed to federal court by the defendant, the districtjudge must adjudicate the matter in federal court or remand the action to the state court. 45 If remanded, appellate review of the remand
order creates a confusing issue.4 6 This issue has a long and complicated
history beginning with review of remand orders by the United States Supreme Court, followed by the establishment of a general bar on appellate
47
review and continuing today with the gradual evisceration of that bar.
1.

History of the Bar on Remand Review

From 1789 to 1875, the Supreme Court conducted appellate review of
remand orders by writs of mandamus. 48 The Act of March 3, 1875 expressly permitted review of remanded cases by the Supreme Court and
soon the Court became overloaded with such appeals. 49 As a result, appeltions involving financial institution under its jurisdiction to federal court); 12
U.S.C. § 1819(b) (2) (B) (2004) (granting Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
power to remove state court actions to which it is party).
44. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 3729, at 195 (noting areas where
Congress favors federal adjudication).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2004) (outlining procedure after removal).
46. See Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appellate Review of Remand Orders in Removed Cases:
Are They Losing a Certain Appeal?, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 535, 537 (1998) (referring to
exasperating area of confusion); Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming FederalAppellate Review, 58 Mo. L. REv. 287, 289 (1993) (addressing issue of
appellate review of remand orders); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L. J. 83, 86
(1994) (questioning wisdom of bar on appellate review of remand orders).
47. See Hrdlick, supranote 46, at 538-45 (outlining history of statutory bar on
review of remand orders); Solimine, supra note 46, at 290-94 (same); Wasserman,
supra note 46, at 87-108 (same).
48. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 90 ("Congressional silence regarding the
reviewability of remand orders was not read to preclude such review."). The Supreme Court heard these appeals because the circuit courts of appeals were not
established until 1891. See Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 539 n.17 (referring to Act of
March 3, 1891, which created intermediate appellate courts). Writs of mandamus
were used because remands did not, at that time, represent a "final order" subject
to appeal. See Solimine, supra note 46, at 290 (noting that remand decisions were
"not 'final orders' subject to appeal, and could only be reviewed by a writ of mandamus"). A writ of mandamus has "traditionally been used in federal courts only
'to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' Will v. United
States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S.
21, 26 (1943)).
49. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 92 ("[R] emand orders would be subject
to appellate review by providing that 'the order of said circuit court dismissing or
remanding said cause to the State court shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court
.... (quoting
."
Ayers v. Chicago, 101 U.S. 184, 187 (1879))). On the heels of the
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late review of remand orders was short-lived; the Act of March 3, 1887
("Act of 1887") barred appellate review of remand orders. 50 Following the
enactment of the Act of 1887, federal circuit courts consistently held that
remand orders were not subject to appellate review. 5 1 The prohibition of
appellate review in the Act of 1887 is presently codified in § 1447(d) of the
United States Code, which states "[a] n order remanding a case to the State
52
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."
2.

Exceptions to the Bar on Remand Review

Despite the clear intent of § 1447(d), Congress and the courts have
whittled away at its seemingly decisive language, creating exceptions to the
bar on appellate review. 53 Three major exceptions permit review of remand orders. 54 Regardless of the logic or benefit behind these exceptions, it is undeniable they eviscerate the bar on review of remand orders
55
established in § 1447(d).
Civil War, Congress drastically expanded the original and removal jurisdiction of
the federal courts in the Act of 1875. See id. at 91-92 (discussing impact of Act of
1875 and enlarged federal jurisdiction).
50. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553 (1887) (establishing bar
on appellate review of remand orders). The provision stated "such remand shall
be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the
decision of the circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed." Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that, prior to creation of the circuit courts of appeals, federal trial courts were referred to as circuit courts. See Hrdlick, supra note
46, at 540 n.22 (noting use of term "circuit court" for federal trial court). There is
very little information regarding the congressional intent for this change, but the
most common cited reasons are: (1) the Supreme Court's overcrowded docket;
and (2) to prevent delay and costs by prolonged litigation of jurisdictional issues.
See Solimine, supra note 46, at 291-92 (recognizing Supreme Court caseload and
prevention of delay as policy reasons for review bar). "Congress, by the adoption
of these provisions... established the policy of not permitting interruption of the
litigation of the merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions of
jurisdiction .... " United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946). One commentator highlights the intention of Congress to prevent corporations from using the
appeal process as a weapon to delay proceedings and increase their opponents'
litigation costs. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 95 (describing benefit corporations received by seeking removal "because some plaintiffs were unwilling to incur
the costs of making a motion to remand").
51. See Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 543 (citing early cases immediately following
passage of Act of 1887). "[W]e think, it was the intention of congress to make the
judgment of the circuit court remanding a cause to the state court final and conclusive." Id. at 543 n.35 (quoting In re Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890)).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2004) (continuing bar on appellate review established in Act of 1887) (emphasis added).
53. SeeWasserman, supra note 46, at 119 (noting use of exceptions to expand
opportunities for appellate review).
54. For a discussion of the three exceptions to the § 1447(d) bar, see infra
notes 56-96 and accompanying text. See also Solimine, supra note 46, at 312 (discussing other exceptions including constitutional and interlocutory exceptions).
55. See Solomine, supra note 46, at 312 (explaining that carved out exceptions
permit review of remands once thought barred).
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Statutorily Created Exceptions

There are three statutory exceptions to the prohibition of appellate
review set forth in § 1447(d). 56 First, under the express language of
§ 1447(d), appellate courts may review remand orders in civil rights
cases. 57 Second, Congress has authorized the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC") to
remove any state court actions in which they are a party and appeal any
remand orders. 58 Finally, the United States has been granted authority to
appeal remand orders in actions involving Native American tribes. 59 The
nature and intent of the statutory exceptions illustrates Congress's concern with both denying parties access to a federal forum as well as the
60
potential for erroneous remand orders on important federal law issues.
b.

Thermtron Exception

Despite the clear language of § 1447(d), the Supreme Court and
courts of appeals have recognized certain exceptions to the bar on appellate review. 6 1 The first major exception originates in the Supreme Court's
56. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 3740, at 519-21 (listing three statutory exceptions); Wasserman, supra note 46, at 103-08 (detailing three areas
where Congress has authorized review of remand orders).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ("[A]n order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed pursuant to § 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise."). Section 1443 is the specialized removal provision for civil
rights cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2004) (permitting removal of civil rights cases to
federal court). The intent of this provision was to ensure that defendants in civil
rights actions "have access to a federal forum, even if the district court erroneously
remanded the suit to state court, and to ensure the development of a uniform
federal law regarding civil rights removal jurisdiction." Wasserman, supra note 46,
at 105.
58. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, § 3740, at 520-21 (detailing FDIC
and RTC empowerment to remove state court actions to federal court and appeal
any remand orders). The Fifth Circuit described the intent of the exception to
allow the "FDIC to develop and rely on a national and uniform body of law, consistent with eliminating problems identified by Congress in having less rigorous state
standards coexisting with federal ones." In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 515
(5th Cir. 1992).
59. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 104 (addressing Native American tribe
exception to language in § 1447(d)). Congress intended this exception to legislatively overrule the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742
(1946), which barred review of remand orders in Native American land cases. See
id. (describing congressional intent for exception).
60. See id. at 108 (summarizing intent of Congress in creating three exceptions). Any costs involved with review of the remand orders-disruption of state
proceeding and clogged federal docket-are outweighed by the benefits of
preventing erroneous decisions. See id. (analyzing congressional intent for
exceptions).
61. See Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 545-61 (discussing Thermtron exception);
Solimine, supra note 46, at 312-22 (same); Wasserman, supra note 46, at 109-30
(outlining judicially created exceptions to statutory bar on review of remand
orders).
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decision in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer.62 In that case, two
Kentucky citizens filed an action for damages against Thermtron Products,
63
Inc. ("Thermtron"), an Indiana corporation, and one of its employees.
Thermtron removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, but
the district judge remanded the case sua sponte because of an overcrowded
docket.6 4 Thermtron filed a writ of mandamus with the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 65 The appellate court denied the petition because of
66
the bar on review of remand orders in § 1447(d).
Upon granting certiorari and hearing the case, the Court framed the
issue as "whether § 1447(d) also bars review where a case has been properly removed and the remand order is issued on grounds not authorized
by § 1447(c)." 6 7 The Court concluded that § 1447(d) only bars appellate
review of remand orders issued under § 1447(c)-lack of jurisdiction or
improvident removal-because the two sections are in pari materia and
should be read together. 68 The decision was heavily criticized for being
blind to the congressional intent of the bar on review. 69 In addition, the

62. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
63. See id. at 337 (describing action arising out of automobile accident between plaintiff's automobile and truck driven by Thermtron employee).
64. See id. at 338 (explaining removal by Thermtron to United States District
Court for Eastern District of Kentucky pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446).
The district judge remanded eight months after removal stating "that 'there is no
available time in which to try the above-styled action in the foreseeable future' and
that an adjudication of the merits would be expedited in the state court." Id. at
339 (quoting district court order).
65. See id. at 341-42 (discussing writ of mandamus petition filed in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals).
66. See id. (discussing denial of writ by court of appeals). The Sixth Circuit
concluded: (1) the district court had jurisdiction to enter remand; and (2) it had
no jurisdiction to review because of § 1447(d). See id. (describing grounds for denial of writ of mandamus).
67. Id. at 343. The Court concluded that, by remanding for an overcrowded
docket, the "District Court exceeded its authority in remanding on grounds not
permitted by the controlling statute." See id. at 345 (stating district court exceeded
power under § 1447(c)). At the time of Thermtron, § 1447(c) referenced remand
for lack ofjurisdiction or improvident removal. See id. at 343 (citing grounds for
remand in § 1447(c)); see also Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 548 (noting appellate review of remand orders had been denied for ninety years before certiorari granted
in Thermtron).
68. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345-46 (concluding that §§ 1447(c) and
1447(d) are in pari materia). "It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in
pan materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may
be resolved by looking at another on the same subject." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY
807 (8th ed. 2004).
69. See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 354 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Congress's purpose in barring review of all remand orders has always been very clear-to prevent
the additional delay which a removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsideration of an order of remand.").
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Thermtron test proved difficult to apply, and over the years the Supreme

70
Court and lower courts have struggled with and modified the test.

The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Thermtron with its decision
in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petraca.7 1 In that case, a bankruptcy proceed-

ing was removed to federal court under both the specialized bankruptcy
73
The District
removal provision 72 and the general removal provision.
removal was
the
Court of Ohio remanded the case to state court because
74
the
dismissed
Circuit
the
Sixth
The defendant appealed, and
untimely.
of
review
appellate
appeal concluding that §§ 1447(d) and 1452(d) barred
75
afand
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
the remand order.
firmed.7 6 The Court rejected the argument that the § 1447(d) bar did not
apply to a specialized removal provision like § 1452. 7 7 The Court stated,
"[s]ection 1447(d) applies 'not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand
78
made in cases removed under any other statues, as well.'

70. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1988) (holding
that district courts have discretion to remand cases within their jurisdiction for
reasons not stated in § 1447(c)). In Carnegie-Mellon, the district court remanded a
pendent state law claim after all federal law claims were eliminated. See id. at 346
(stating procedural history). The Court found it was within the district court's
discretion to remand "upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction
over the case would be inappropriate." See id. at 357 (relying on discretion granted
to district courts in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),
over pendent jurisdiction); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
731 (1996) (permitting review of remand order based on abstention principles
only where relief being sought is equitable or discretionary).
71. 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
72. See id. at 126 (noting defendant removed under bankruptcy provision); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2004) (stating procedure for appeal of bankruptcy actions). Section 1452(a) provides that: "A party may remove any claim or cause of
action in a civil action other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
...to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending .... ."). Id.
Section 1452(b) contains similar language to that in § 1447(d): "An order entered
under this section remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals ... or by the
Supreme Court." Id.
73. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 126 (discussing defendant's removal
under general removal provision). For a discussion of the general removal provision, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
74. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 126-27 (noting district court overturned
bankruptcy court and remanded to state court).
75. See id. at 127 (discussing Sixth Circuit's unpublished disposition holding
review was barred).
76. See id. (granting certiorari and affirming Sixth Circuit's dismissal of
appeal).
77. See Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 560 ('justice Thomas reasoned that
§ 1447(d) is in pari materia with all removal statutes, not just § 1447(c), and thus
has a broad application to any remand order issued under a removal statute.").
78. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 128 (holding review is barred regardless
of whether action was removed under bankruptcy or general removal provision
(quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946))). The untimely removal
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Substantive Issue Exception

Another exception to the appellate bar is found in a line of cases
beginning with the Supreme Court decision in Waco v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. 79 In Waco, a Texas citizen brought a personal injury action
in state court against the City of Waco, Texas ("Waco"). 80 Waco filed a
cross-action against Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("Fidelity"), which removed
the action to federal court.8 I The district court dismissed Fidelity as an
improper party, concluded there were no longer grounds for diversity jurisdiction between Waco and the Texas citizen, and remanded the action
to state court.8 2 Waco appealed the dismissal of the cross-action but not
83
the remand order.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand order was not reviewable. 84 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and acknowledged the statutory bar on appellate review. 85 Nevertheless, the
Court stated that "in logic and in fact the decree of dismissal preceded
that of remand and was made by the District Court while it had control of
the case." 8 6 The Supreme Court permitted review of the dismissal. 87 Consequently, the Waco doctrine has been found to permit review when a district court makes a substantive decision on the merits in remanding a
88
case.
Fifty years after Waco, the Ninth Circuit held that a remand decision
was reviewable in Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc.89 In

Pelleport,the case was removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, but was
remanded because of a forum selection clause in a contract between the
parties that required all disputes to be litigated in state court.90 The
Thermtron exception could have applied because the remand order was not
was found to be a defect clearly within the scope of § 1447(c). See id. (concluding
district court remand decision was not reviewable).
79. 293 U.S. 140 (1934).
80. See id. at 141 (discussing basis for action arising from collision with street
obstruction).

81. See id. (noting Fidelity was surety on bond that Waco sought to recover
upon).

82. See id. at 142 (stating contents of district court order).
83. See id. (identifying grounds for Waco's appeal).

84. See id. at 142-43 (stating Fifth Circuit holding).
85. See id. at 143 (noting "no appeal lies from the order of remand").
86. Id.
87. See id. at 144 (holding Fifth Circuit can hear appeal of dismissal of thirdparty claim).
88. See Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 545 n.40 (discussing Waco doctrine and expansion by Ninth Circuit in Pelleport); Solimine, supra note 46, at 315 n.147 (explaining Waco doctrine and its use in permitting review of remand orders);
Wasserman, supra note 46, at 119 (noting that courts of appeals have expanded
opportunities for appellate review).
89. 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984).
90. See id. at 275 (recounting procedural history of case and district court
finding that clause was valid and enforceable).
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on a ground specified in § 1447(c). 9 1 The Ninth Circuit, however, utilized
Waco to conclude that the districtjudge "reached a substantive decision on
the merits apartfrom any jurisdictionaldecision."92 Therefore, the enforceability of the forum selection clause could be reviewed because "to hold
otherwise would deprive Budco [Quality Theaters, Inc.] of its right to ap93
peal a substantive determination of contract law."
Since 1984, other courts of appeals have relied on Peleport and Waco
to justify appellate review of decisions that form the basis for remand orders. 94 The substantive issue exception, however, is routinely found not to
apply when the substantive issue is intrinsic to a jurisdictional remand order. 95 The creation of these complicated exception doctrines highlights
96
the judicial frustration with limitations on appellate review.
III.

FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAMEWORK

Securities laws are intended to protect investors and ensure confidence in the capital markets.

97

Securities regulation has long been an

91. See id. at 276 (relying on Waco rather than Thermtron to hold district court
decision was substantive decision subject to review); Solimine, supra note 46, at 312
(noting that remand in Pelleport was not predicated on "ground specified in Section 1447(c)").
92. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 120 ("Rather than invoking the Thermtron
exception, which would have permitted appellate review of a remand order issued
on grounds not specified in section 1447(c), the Ninth Circuit relied on Waco
.... .).
93. See id. ("We cannot believe Congress intended to immunize such decisions
from review." (quoting Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 277)).
94. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 779
F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985) (permitting appellate review of remand order). In
Clorox, the Ninth Circuit heard an appeal of a remand order based on the district
court's finding that content of an employee handbook estopped Clorox from removing the case. See id. at 520 (citing Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 276-78) ("As in Pelleport,
the remand order in this case is appealable .... "); see also Wasserman, supra note
46, at 121-26 (discussing cases where Pelleport was applied).
95. See Clorox, 779 F.2d at 520 (noting Pelleport exception is not applicable
when substantive issue is not apart from jurisdictional decision); see also Lyons v.
Alaska Teamsters Employer Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding Pelleport exception does not allow review of substantive legal question necessary
to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed); Baldridge v. Ky.-Ohio
Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1341, 1349 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's argument
that Pelleport/ Clorox exception applies because "heart of this decision was jurisdictional") (citation omitted); Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 951 F.2d
325, 329 (11th Cir. 1992)); Solimine, supra note 46, at 312-13 (citing Caledron v.
Aerovias Nacionales de Colom., 929 F.2d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1991)) (noting Eleventh Circuit's refusal to review remand order on lack of complete preemption and
substantial federal question).
96. See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 108-09 (noting that judicially created
exceptions exhibit courts' attempts to get around § 1447(d) bar).
97. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (stating purpose of securities laws). The ultimate goal is to promote public and global confidence in the
capital markets. See id. (explaining intent). For a full discussion of the federal
securities laws, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIEs REGULATIONS (4th
ed. 2002).
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area of concurrent control between the federal government and the
states. 98 Congress has recently paid special attention to this dual system by
enacting the PSLRA and SLUSA to ensure the integrity of private securities litigation. 99
A.

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA in response to the widely held
belief that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws were being abused by plaintiffs. 00 The primary concern of legislators was strike
suits-in which plaintiffs filed meritless class actions that alleged fraud in
the sale of securities. 10 1 Deep-pocketed defendants often settled these
suits regardless of the merits because the settlement amount was often less
than the potential litigation expenses.10 2 The PSLRA addressed the issue
98. See Painter, supra note 4, at 24 (noting that "the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act
explicitly allowed for concurrent securities regulation by the states"). For a full
discussion of the dual system of securities regulation, see id. at 20-31.
99. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (expressing concern over securities
markets). Private securities litigation has always been considered a key enforcement element enabling defrauded investors to recover their losses without government involvement. See id. (describing need for protection of integral area).
100. See id. at 31 (providing Statement of Managers for PSLRA). The PSLRA
was enacted to "protect investors, issuers, and all who are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities litigation." Id. at 32. Congress passed the legislation over President Clinton's veto. See Message to the House of Representatives
Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
PUB. PAPERS 1912 (Dec. 19, 1995) (refusing to sign current legislation). President
Clinton later noted that "[w] hen the bill returned to the House and Senate floors
after my veto, the bill's supporters made clear that they did intend to codify the
Second Circuit standard. After this important assurance, the bill passed over my
veto." Statement on Signing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, PUB. PAPERS 1974-75 (Nov. 3, 1998).
101. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (defining purpose of strike

suits). "The purpose of these strike suits is to extract a sizeable settlement from
companies that are forced to settle, regardless of the lack of merits of the suit,
simply to avoid the potentially bankrupting expense of litigating." Id. Congress
heard testimony on many of the abusive practices including:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others
whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint
hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical
for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action
lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
102. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1341 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (noting strike suits are "brought for the purpose of forcing
securities defendants into large settlements in order to avoid costly discovery"); In
reTime Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining tension
in pre-PSLRA securities litigation). There is a need to deter fraud in the securities
markets; however, there is also a need to deter "use of the litigation process as a
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of strike suits by instituting a heightened pleading standard and a
mandatory stay of discovery. 113 The PSLRA, however, proved to be largely
0
ineffective because of its federal flight loophole.1 4 This loophole enabled plaintiffs to evade the PSLRA provisions by filing in state court under
105
state securities laws.
B.

Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct of 1998

Congress passed SLUSA to prevent plaintiffs from evading the PSLRA
provisions. 10 6 SLUSA makes federal courts the exclusive venue for most
device for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the extensive
discovery costs." Id.
103. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b) (2) (2004) (setting forth heightened pleading standard for private securities
fraud actions). The plaintiff is required to "state with particularity facts giving a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." Id.; see
also Securities Act of 1933 § 27(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (b) (2004) (providing for automatic stay of discovery upon filing of motion to dismiss); Securities Act of 1934
§ 21D(b) (3) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (3) (B) (same). "In any private action arising
under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the
pendency of any motion to dismiss...." 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b) (3) (B).
104. See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107-08 (2d
Cir. 2001) (discussing "federal flight"). "By suing in state court under state statutory or common law, these litigants were able to assert many of the same causes of
action, but avoid the heightened procedural requirements instituted in federal
court." Id.
105. See Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232
(D.NJ. 2000) ("PSLRA drove many would-be plaintiffs to file their claims in state
court, based on state law, in order to avoid the heightened pleading requirements
of PSLRA."). The PSLRA reforms were procedural in nature and would apply only
if the action was filed in federal court. See, e.g., Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 968 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Cal. 1999) (stating plaintiffs brought action
for misrepresentation and fraud based on California Corporations Code sections
in state court); see also Michael G. Dailey, Preemption of State Court Class Claims for
Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 589-90 (1999)
(detailing number of suits filed in state court following enactment of PSLRA) (citation omitted). "Professor Michael Perino reported that between 1992 and 1994 no
more than four securities cases alleging fraud were brought in state court in any
one year. In the first eighteen months after the passage of the PSLRA, ninety-four
companies were sued in state court for securities fraud." Id. at 611 (footnote
omitted).
106. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 1-2 (1998) (providing congressional
intent for passing SLUSA). The report stated:
Congress finds that (1) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 sought to
prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits;
(2) since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has
been presented to Congress that a number of securities class action
lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts;
(3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its
objectives;
(4) State securities regulation is of continuing importance, together
with Federal regulation of securities, to protect investors and promote strong financial markets; and
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securities fraud class actions by preempting state actions based on misrepresentations or omissions made "in connection with" the purchase or sale
of a covered security. 10 7 Congress incorporated a specialized removal provision into SLUSA to augment the preemption mandate.10 8 Defendants
can apply this removal provision to any "covered class action" defined by
SLUSA's preemption provision. 10 9
SLUSA's preemption provision applies to state actions that meet a
four-part test: (1) the suit is a covered class action, 110 (2) the plaintiffs
claims are based on state law, (3) there has been a purchase of a "covered
security"' I1 and (4) the plaintiff alleged a misrepresentation or omission
of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security. 11 2 Because SLUSA's specialized removal provision is connected
(5) in order to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it is appropriate
to enact national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not changing the
current treatment of individual lawsuits.
Id.
107. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2004) (setting
forth SLUSA's preemption provision); Securities Act of 1934 § 28(f)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (1) (2004) (same). The provision states:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any
State or subdivision therefore may be maintained in any State or Federal
court by any private party alleging (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security.
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive

device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 16 (1998) (detailing intent for removal
provision). "This provision is designed to prevent a State court from inadvertently,
improperly, or otherwise maintaining jurisdiction over an action that is preempted
....
Id.
109. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (setting forth removal provision); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f)(2) (same). The Act states, "[a]ny covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in [the preemption provision],
shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action
is pending, and shall be subject to [the preemption provision]." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(c) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2) (same). For the full preemption provision of SLUSA, see supra note 107.
110. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(f) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2) (defining covered class action); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f) (5) (B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (5) (B) (same).
111. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(f) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (3) (defining covered security); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §28(f)(5)(E), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (5) (E) (same).
112. See Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1092 (11th Cir. 2002) (setting forth four-part preemption test); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 596
(8th Cir. 2002) (same); Cape Ann Investors, LLC v. Lepone, 296 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9
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to the preemption provision in the statute, the specialized removal provi13
sion is also subject to the four-part test."
SLUSA also contains a remand provision that requires the district
court to remand a removed action if SLUSA preemption is not applicable.i" 4 Once remanded, the litigation is maintained in state court."1 5 The
purpose of the remand provision is to preserve state actions that were improperly removed.'1 6 Significantly, SLUSA's remand provision does not
include an express exception to the § 1447(d) bar on appellate review of
7
remand orders.' "
SLUSA's preemption, removal and remand provisions work in concert to achieve the goals of the statute. 1 8 First, a defendant removes a
state action to federal court under the removal provision.' 9 Second, the
district judge applies the four-part test from the preemption provision to
(D. Mass 2003) (same); In reWaste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 594
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (same).
113. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,
1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating four-part test as applied to removal). Thus, in order
to remove an action to federal court under SLUSA, the removing party must show
that (1) the suit is a covered class action, (2) the plaintiffs' claims are based on
state law, (3) one or more "covered securities" has been purchased or sold, and (4)
the defendant misrepresented or omitted a material fact "in connection with the
purchase or sale of such security." Id.; see also Shaw v. Charles Schwab & Co., 128 F.
Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("SLUSA requires that the removing party
demonstrate [the four-part test] ....");Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc., 124
F. Supp. 2d 229, 231 (D.N.J. 2000) (same). "SLUSA's removal provision makes
removable any class action preempted by [SLUSA]." Spielman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2003).
114. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d) (4) (requiring
remand); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(3)(D),
15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (3) (D) (same). The provision provides, "[i]n an action that has been
removed from a State court pursuant to [the removal provision], if the Federal
court determines that the action may be maintained in State court pursuant to this
subsection, the Federal court shall remand such action to such State court." 15
U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(d) (same).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 17 (1998) (noting action is maintained in
state court upon being remanded).
116. See id. (stating congressional intent for remand provision). "This is intended as a savings clause, so that in the event of improper removal of the limited
universe of cases over which State court jurisdiction has been preserved .
the
Federal court would remand such action back to State court." Id.
117. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 126 (recognizing that SLUSA does not contain
statutory exception to § 1447(d)).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 16-17 (discussing interaction of SLUSA
provisions).
119. See, e.g., Magyery v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 954,
956 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (detailing procedure of SLUSA). Plaintiff filed a class action
in Indiana state court alleging four state law causes of action: breach of contract,
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent supervision. See id. (describing
plaintiff's action). Defendants removed to federal court alleging the plaintiffs
state law claims were completely preempted by SLUSA. See id. at 955 (discussing
removal).
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determine if removal is proper and preemption applicable. 12 0 If the fourpart test is met, removal is proper, SLUSA preempts the state action and
the district judge will dismiss it. 1 2 1 If the four-part test is not met, removal
is improper, preemption does not apply and the federal judge must

remand. 122
IV.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

Controversy has developed in the circuit courts as to whether a remand order under SLUSA can be reviewed by an appellate court. 123 The
120. See id. (describing procedure following removal). The court noted that
[o]nce removed, however, the district court must examine the complaint to determine whether substantive requirements necessary to sustain removal under
SLUSA's preemption provision have been satisfied as these requirements determine whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the
action." Id. at 958.
121. See, e.g., Winne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 315 F.
Supp. 2d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding preemption applies). Plaintiff filed a
class action alleging state law claims, which was removed by defendant based on
SLUSA. See id. (noting history of action). The court found "SLUSA's removal provision applies here because the relevant criteria under the statute are met." Id. at
413. The court dismissed the action after concluding that the removal and preemption provisions were satisfied. See id. at 416 (dismissing action).
122. See, e.g., Magyery, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (stating preemption is not applicable). The Magyery court noted that the plaintiff did not "allege a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities." Id. (concluding four-part test is not met). The defendant failed to
satisfy the requirements for preemption; therefore, the action had to be remanded
to the state court for further adjudication. See id. (denying defendant's motion to
dismiss and remanding).
123. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating threshold issue is whether appellate court has
jurisdiction over appeals of remand orders).
During the publication process for this Note, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the review of remand orders under SLUSA. See Williams v. AFC Enters., Inc., No.
04-10104, 2004 WL 2480743, at *1 (lth Cir. Nov. 5, 2004) (stating issue on appeal). The plaintiff filed a class action in state court under the Securities Act of
1933. See id. (detailing cause of action). The defendants removed the action to
federal court under the SLUSA removal provision and the plaintiff filed a motion
to remand. See id. (discussing procedure of action). In granting the remand,
"[t]he district court struggled with what it described as the 'murky' language of
SLUSA's removal provisions." Id. As a result, the district court stayed its remand
order sua sponte and certified the order for interlocutory appeal. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit had to first determine if it had jurisdiction to review the remand order. See
id. (stating jurisdictional issue). The Eleventh Circuit noted that a remand order
by a district court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is barred from
review by § 1447(d). See id. at *1-2 (discussing bar on appellate review of remand
orders). In evaluating the district court's order, the Eleventh Circuit commented
on the unusual analysis. See id. at *3 (reviewing grounds for district court's remand
order). The district court concluded that SLUSA intended for federal courts to be
the exclusive venue for securities class actions. See id. (stating how district court
intertpreted SLUSA). "Despite this analysis, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand the case." Id. Notwithstanding the district court's confusion with
SLUSA, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and § 1447(d) barred review of that order. See id. (concluding
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jurisdictions where the split has occurred are the centers of securities litiof regation. 124 The Second and Ninth Circuits do not permit review
125
mand orders, whereas the Seventh Circuit permits such reviews.
A.

No Appellate Review: Second and Ninth Circuits

The Second Circuit decided the first major case on reviewability of
remand orders in 2003 in Spielman v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith,
Inc.12 6 In Spielman, the plaintiff alleged six causes of action under New
York law for misleading statements about the imposition of securities
transaction fees. 127 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. ("Merrill
Lynch") removed the case to federal court under the SLUSA removal pro128
The district court detervision and the general removal provision.
mined the four-part preemption test was not met by concluding the
alleged misrepresentations were not made in connection with the
12 9
The district judge granted
purchase or sale of a covered security.
Spielman's motion for remand and Merrill Lynch appealed the remand
order alleging that the district court misapplied the four-part preemption
"§ 1447(d) proscribes appellate review of th[e] remand order"). The Eleventh
Circuit's opinion "does not mention any other appellate rulings on the issue, but
appears to be consistent with the decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits, and
possibly in tension with a Seventh Circuit ruling." Order Remanding 1933 Securities
Act Claims to State Court Not Reviewable Even if Wrong, 73 U.S.L.W. 1286-87 (Nov. 16,

2004). Also, in the course of its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the
SLUSA removal provision "makes reference to subsection (b), SLUSA's preemption provision." See AFC Enters., 2004 WL 2480743, at *3 (stating SLUSA's removal
provision incorporates SLUSA's preemption provision). For a discussion of why
this is the correct reading of SLUSA's removal provision, see infra notes 177-91
and accompanying text.
124. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 15, at 13 (providing statistics that
majority of class action filings occurred in Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 7 (same).
125. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004)
(noting circuit split).
126. 332 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2003).
127. See id. at 121 (noting plaintiffs actions: "breach of contract; breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; breach of fiduciary duty; and violation of New York Consumer Protection
Law"). Spielman alleged Merrill Lynch made statements that he could make transactions on his Cash Management Account without a transaction fee, but he was
actually charged a two percent fee. See id. (discussing basis for plaintiff's action).
128. See id. (noting removal under SLUSA and general provision).
129. See id. (providing district court basis for remand); Spielman v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 01 CIV 3013 (DLC), 2001 WL 1182927, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2001) (concluding misrepresentations about transactions fees
were not integral to purchase or sale of securities). The other three components
of the test were met and the "in connection with" requirement was the only element in dispute. See id. at *2 ("The parties do not dispute ... that the first three of
the four requirements for removal exist.").
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test. 130 The issue on appeal was whether the Second Circuit may review
the district court's remand order.1 3 '
The Second Circuit noted that SLUSA did not contain a statutory exception to the bar on appellate review of remand orders.1 32 The Second
Circuit also recognized that SLUSA's application is the only way for subject matter jurisdiction to exist.' 3 3 Finally, the Second Circuit concluded
that SLUSA's four-part preemption test had to be satisfied for the district
court to proceed. 13 4 Otherwise, subject matter jurisdiction was lacking
and the case had to be remanded to state court. 135 The Second Circuit
stated that the district court found the four-part test was not met and re136
manded the state action because of a lack of subject matterjurisdiction.
The Second Circuit reiterated that such remand orders are barred from
review by § 1447(d) and this is true even when a district court grossly mis37
applies the four-part preemption test.'
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently addressed the reviewability of remand orders under SLUSA in United Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Waddell
130. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 122 (noting district court remand order). "Merrill Lynch appeals the remand order as erroneously granted." Id.
131. See id. (stating issue).
132. See id. at 126 (citing three statutory exceptions to § 1447(d)'s bar).
"SLUSA does not constitute a fourth exception." Id.
133. See id. at 126-27 ("To state the obvious, federal question jurisdiction to
proceed under SLUSA is dependent on SLUSA's applicability."). The case only
involved state law claims, so supplemental jurisdiction was not available. See id. at
121 ("Spielman's complaint alleged no federal cause of action."). In addition, diversity did not exist because Spielman was a citizen of New York and Merrill Lynch
has its principal place of business in New York. See id. (providing background of
parties).
In evaluating SLUSA's preemption provision, the Second Circuit stated that
SLUSA was intended to completely preempt specific types of state securities fraud
claims. See id. at 123 ("The clear and unambiguous language convinces us that
SLUSA was intended to completely preempt the field of certain types of securities
class actions .... "). Further, the Second Circuit stated that the four-part preemption test determines which state court actions are completely preempted and converted into federal actions. See id. at 124 (stating only claims that fall within
SLUSA's preemptive scope are completely preempted and become federal claims).
For a discussion of the complete preemption doctrine, see supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
134. See id. at 126-27 (concluding that if SLUSA is not applicable district
court has no jurisdiction to proceed).
135. See id. at 127 (listing conclusions produced when SLUSA is not applicable). Failing the four-part preemption test "produces three indisputable conclusions: [1] the claim does not fall within SLUSA's preemptive scope, [2] SLUSA
does not apply, and most importantly, [3] federal question jurisdiction to proceed
under SLUSA is lacking." Id.
136. See id. (acknowledging district court's conclusion "in connection with"
requirement was not met). "Our reading of the remand order convinces us that
the remand could not have been predicated on anything other than the district
court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under SLUSA." Id.
at 129.
137. See id. (recognizing "[t]his is true even if the district court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is ill-founded or poorly reasoned").
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& Reed, Inc.138 United Investors Life Insurance Co. ("United Investors")
brought suit in state court against Waddell & Reed, Inc. ("Waddell"), a
broker, for unfair competition under California law. 1 39 Waddell removed
the action to federal court under SLUSA's removal provision and filed a
motion to dismiss based on SLUSA preemption. 140 The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court found SLUSA inapplicable because the
covered class action requirement of the SLUSA four-part test was not satisfied.' 4 1 The district court remanded pursuant to the SLUSA remand provision, and Waddell sought review of its motion to dismiss based on the
142
misapplication of the covered class action requirement.
The Ninth Circuit stated that in order for the district court to possess
subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the four-part preemption test
needed to be satisfied. 143 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district
court concluded that the four-part preemption test was not satisfied, and
138. 360 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2004).
139. See id. at 962 (identifying basis for action). United Investors contends
Waddell "threatened to cause United Investors policy holders to switch to a rival
company unless United Investors consented to increase its commission compensation beyond the original contract price." Id. at 962. United Investors terminated
the relationship with Waddell for the variable annuity contracts and brought suit
in Los Angeles County Superior Court under California's Unfair Competition Law.
See id. (describing action).
140. See id. at 962-63 (noting Waddell removed solely under SLUSA's specialized removal provision). In addition, Waddell filed a timely motion to dismiss asserting "United Investors's state-law securities action falls squarely within SLUSA's
preemption provision ...." Id. at 963.
141. See id. at 963 (examining remand order). The district court remand order stated, "[i]t is further Ordered, sua sponte, that the case be, and hereby is,
Remanded." Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on precedent to "examine the full record before the district court to ascertain the court's 'actual reason' for remanding." Id. at 964 (citation omitted). The parties agreed that three parts of the test
were satisfied and Waddell only needed to show the action was a covered class
action for SLUSA preemption to apply. See id. at 964-65 (presenting dispute on
preemption). United Investors filed the action "[oln behalf of its past and present
policyholders," seeking "injunctive relief to prevent Waddell & Reed from continuing its allegedly false and misleading sales practices, as well as restitution of commissions and other income derived from these practices to be paid to United
Investors's policyholders." Id. at 962. If United Investors's action satisfied the covered class action requirement, SLUSA preemption would apply. See id. at 964 (explaining what Waddell needed to prove for preemption). The court noted that a
covered class action is "any single lawsuit in which . . . damages are sought on
behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions of law
or fact common to those persons . . . predominate over any questions affecting
individual persons or members." Id. at 965 (quoting Securities Act of 1933
§ 16(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2) (A) (2004)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court rejected Waddell's SLUSA preemption argument that this was a
covered class action. See id. at 966 (" [D] istrict court clearly did not accept Waddell
& Reed's SLUSA-preemption argument on the merits.").
142. See id. (noting Waddell's appeal of motion to dismiss).
143. See id. (finding "district court's subject matter jurisdiction depended entirely on SLUSA's preemptive scope"). "[I]n order to establish jurisdiction over
Waddell & Reed's motion to dismiss, the district court would have had to decide
Waddell & Reed's SLUSA preemption claim in its favor." Id.
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therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded as required. 144 Therefore, § 1447(d) controlled the remand decision for lack of subject matterjurisdiction and barred appellate review of
145
the remand order.
B.

Appellate Review Permitted: The Seventh Circuit

In contrast to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit concluded in 2004 that appellate review of remand orders under SLUSA is
permitted in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust.146 The plaintiffs, shareholders
in Putnam Funds Trust ("Putnam"), asserted a state law claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. 147 Putnam removed the action to federal court under
SLUSA's removal provision. 148 The district court remanded because it
found that the plaintiff did not allege a loss in connection with the
1 49
purchase or sale of securities and the defendants appealed that order.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit, addressed the issue of
1 50
reviewability of remand orders.
The Seventh Circuit initially evaluated whether removal of the state
action was proper. 15 1 Judge Easterbrook stated that for an action to be
144. See id. (commenting that Waddell needed to prove covered class action
requirement).
145. See id. at 967 (stating § 1447(d) "precludes appellate review of the district
court's remand order"). The Ninth Circuit noted appellate review is barred "even
if the district court clearly misapplied SLUSA's preemption provisions." Id.
146. 373 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2004).
147. See id. 847-48 (describing basis for action); see also Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Trust, No. 03-CV-0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10327, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Jan. 27, 2004) ("Plaintiffs complaint contains four-counts alleging alternate theories based on state law claims of breach of fiduciary duty."). The Seventh Circuit
recognized that "[b]y foreswearing reliance on federal law plaintiffs hope to avoid
the strictures of federal statutes such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995." Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848.
148. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2) as
only grounds for removal).
149. See id. (addressing finding that SLUSA did not apply). "[The plaintiffs]
have held throughout the class period and claim to be injured by events that diminished the value realized by all investors." Id. The district court remand order
states, "[b]ecause the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court remands
this action to the Madison County, Illinois Circuit Court." Id. (quoting district
court order) (emphasis omitted).
150. See id. (acknowledging "dispute that requires our resolution").
151. See id. at 849 (noting cases where removal was improper); see also Gravitt
v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 430 U.S. 723, 723 (1977) (noting removal was improper
because complete diversity was lacking); Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 361 F.3d 1016,
1019-20 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing improper removal because defendant did not
comply with local district court removal rule); Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 326 F.3d
828, 829 (7th Cir. 2004) (referring to improper removal because court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims); Phoenix Container, L.P. v. Sokoloff,
235 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating removal was improper because notice of
removal was not timely filed). "In Cravitt, Rubel, Adkins, and Phoenix Containerthe
district judges held that removal was improper .... " Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848.
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removed properly, it only needs to be a covered class action.
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an
and
action, removal is improper
§ 1447(d). 153 According to the Seventh Circuit, the district court found
that the suit was properly removed because "this is a 'covered class
154
action."'
The Seventh Circuit then emphasized that the determination of
SLUSA preemption is a substantive decision the district judge is required
to make, and thus, the district court must have jurisdiction to make that
decision.1 5 5 The Seventh Circuit stated that the district court remanded
15 6
Therefore,
only after deciding that SLUSA preemption did not apply.
the Seventh Circuit classified the remand order as "bow[ing] out" once
the district judge's job was done, and not a remand for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 1 57 Finally,Judge Easterbrook concluded with the fol-

152. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 849 (illustrating that if suit involved just forty investors, removal would be improper and subject to bar on appellate review). "Covered class action" is the first prong of the four-part preemption test that is also
used for determining the appropriateness of removal. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (detailing fourpart test). A covered class action is one of three different actions: (1) actions
brought on behalf of more than fifty persons, (2) actions brought on a representative basis and (3) a group ofjoined or consolidated lawsuits. See Securities Act of
1933 § 16(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2) (2004) (defining covered class action); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f) (5) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (5) (B) (2004)
(same).
153. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 849 ("A conclusion that a suit is not a 'covered
class action' ... would imply that removal had been improper, and such a decision
would come within § 1447(d).").
154. See id. (stating district court found removal proper because covered class
action requirement was met). But see Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, No. 03-CV0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10327, *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2004) ("Removal is
appropriate only if the Court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
claims."). The district court found "SLUSA does not permit removal of Plaintiff's
claims" and the court remanded "[b]ecause the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at *8-9.
155. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (stating determination of SLUSA preemption
is requirement for districtjudge). "SLUSA means, however, that one specific substantive decision in securities litigation must be made by the federal judiciary
rather than the state judiciary." Id. (emphasis added).
156. See id. at 849 ("Only after making the substantive decision that Congress
authorized it to make did the district court remand.").
157. See id. ("After making the decision required by [SLUSA], the district
"). In conducting this analysis, the Seventh
court had nothing else to do ....
Circuit made a distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and bowing out:
"We must distinguish between a decision that 'this court lacks adjudicatory competence' and a decision that 'the court has been authorized to do X and having done
so should bow out.' The former implies lack of subject matterjurisdiction... ; the
latter implies the presence of jurisdiction." Id. at 850. Judge Easterbrook referenced the recent Supreme Court cases of Kontrick v. Ryan and Scarborough v.
Principi to support the notion that the district court's use of the term "lack of
jurisdiction" is not conclusive. See id. at 849 (citing Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S.
Ct. 1856, 1864-65 (2004); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 (2004)) (explaining that 'judges sometimes use the word 'jurisdiction' when they mean some-
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lowing analysis: "The suit was properly removed. The district judge made
a substantive decision under authority granted by a federal statute. It fol58
lows that the remand is unaffected by § 1447(d)."'
Judge Easterbrook also addressed the practical reasons for permitting
appellate review of remand orders under SLUSA.' 59 He emphasized that
the need for accurate and consistent SLUSA application outweighs the
small cost caused by the delay of appellate review. 160 Recognizing that
SLUSA preemption is only determined by the federal judiciary, Judge Easterbrook was fearful of the prospect that a "major substantive issue in the
case will escape review." 161 While the Seventh Circuit noted its decision
would cause a circuit split, it nevertheless disagreed with the Second and
1
Ninth Circuits' holdings that appellate review is barred by § 1447(d). 62

V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Appellate Review Is Barred

The § 1447(d) bar on review of remand orders is applicable to
SLUSA's specialized removal and remand provisions. 163 This follows from
the holding in Things Remembered, in which the Supreme Court held
§ 1447(d) applies to all statutory removal and remand provisions. 16 4 Having determined § 1447(d) applies, the next step in determining whether
§ 1447(d) bars appellate review of SLUSA remand orders is to evaluate if
thing else"). Similar to the complaint filing rules at issue in Kontrick or the thirty
day time limitation rule in Scarborough, the Seventh Circuit asserted that the determination of SLUSA preemption does not define the subject matter jurisdiction of
the district court. See id. at 850 (holding case was properly removed and remanded
when federal job was done and not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). For a
full discussion of the holdings in Kontrick and Scarborough, see supra note 29.
158. Id. at 850 (holding remand order was reviewable).
159. See id. (commenting that holding also "makes practical sense too").
160. See id. (focusing on need for correct decisions). The court noted that, if

necessary, an appeal's disposition can be expedited. See id. (detailing way to accel-

erate process).
161.. Id. (noting that appellate review of SLUSA preemption is "now or
never").
162. See id. at 850-51 (citicizing two courts of appeals decisions on reviewability of remand orders). "Both the second and ninth circuits were mesmerized
by the word 'jurisdiction' and did not see the difference between a case that never
should have been removed and a case properly removed and remanded only when
the federal job is done." Id. at 851. Judge Easterbrook emphasized that the courts
in Spielman and United Investors did not discuss the holdings in Kontrick or Scarborough. See id. at 850-51 ("All of these decisions precede Scarborough, and although
United Investors came a month after Kontrick the court did not discuss it.").
163. For a discussion of SLUSA's specialized provisions, see supra notes
108-22 and accompanying text.
164. SeeThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) ("Section 1447(d) applies 'not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the
general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under
any other statutes, as well."' (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752
(1946))) (alteration in original).
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these orders are reviewable under one of the previously discussed exceptions: statutory, Thermtron or substantive issue.1 65 This analysis focuses on
reviewability in suits based exclusively on state law that are remanded because at least one element of the four-part SLUSA preemption test is not
satisfied.1 66
1.

No Statutory Exception Exists

Actions remanded under SLUSA do not fit into one of the three statutory exceptions to the § 1447(d) bar on appellate review. 167 Moreover,
Congress did not include an express statutory exception to the § 1447(d)
bar in SLUSA's specialized remand provision.' 68 Congress has expressly
provided only three statutory exceptions.' 6 9 The absence of such an exception in SLUSA can be interpreted as a result of the congressional bias
170
against review of remand orders.
2.

Thermtron Exception Is Not Applicable

The Second, Ninth and Seventh Circuits all attempted to reconcile
the § 1447(d) bar with the Thermtron line of cases.1 71 Under the Thermtron
exception, if a remand is made on § 1447(c) grounds-lack of subject
matter jurisdiction or procedural defect-the appellate bar of § 1447(d)
165. For a discussion of the statutory, Thermtron and substantive issue exceptions, see supra notes 53-96 and accompanying text.
166. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848 (noting suit based solely on state causes of
action and SLUSA preemption test not satisfied); United Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(same); Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002)
(same).
167. See Abada, 300 F.3d at 1119 (stating that "none of the relevant exceptions
to the statutory prohibition of appellate review of district court orders remanding
...applies").
168. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 126 ("Ultimately we are aware of only three
statutory exceptions to Section 1447(d)'s bar .... SLSUA does not constitute a
fourth exception."). For a discussion of the SLUSA remand provision and the absence of a statutory exception to the § 1447(d) bar, see supra notes 114-17 and
accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the three statutorily created exceptions to the bar on
appellate review-civil rights cases, RTC and FDIC actions and Native American
tribe cases-see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
170. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) ("Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Congress is 'aware
of the universality of th [e] practice' of denying appellate review of remand orders
when Congress creates a new ground for removal." (quoting United State v. Rice,
327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946))) (alteration in original); see also id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing "a 'strong congressional policy against remand orders,'
underlies .. .§ 1447(d)" (quoting Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 492 (5th
Cir. 1987))).
171. Compare Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848-49 (presenting issue of reconciling
§ 1447(d) with Thermtron lines of cases), with United Investors, 360 F.3d at 963
(same), with Spielman, 332 F.3d at 125 (same).
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applies. 17 2 If a remand is not based upon these grounds, § 1447(d) does
not apply. 173 The Seventh Circuit attempted to invoke the Thermtron exception by claiming that because removal was proper, any subsequent remand could not be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and § 1447(d)
did not apply. 174 In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits found Thermtron not applicable because the district court remanded for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 175 Therefore, it is important to clarify two issues: (1)
when removal is proper under SLUSA; and (2) how a district court obtains
176
subject matter jurisdiction over a state action under SLUSA.
a.

Removal Is Only Proper When the Four-Part Preemption Test
Is Met

SLUSA's specialized removal provision makes it difficult for courts to
determine whether a case is properly removed. 177 Fortunately, Judge Easterbrook provided a clear example of when an action is improperly removed and subject to the § 1447(d) bar on appellate review: "A
conclusion that a suit is not a 'covered class action' . . . would imply that
removal had been improper, and such a decision would come within
§ 1447(d).'1 78 ThusJudge Easterbrook appears to maintain that the covered class action requirement is the threshold factor for determining if
1 79
removal is proper.
In United Investors, the Ninth Circuit addressed an illustration ofJudge
Easterbrook's improper removal example. 180 The parties in that case
agreed that the covered class action requirement was the only part of the
172. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 127-28 (discussing Thermtron holding).
173. See id. (holding § 1447(d) does not apply if outside § 1447(c)'s scope);
see also Quackenbush v. Allstate, Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 715 (1996) (permitting
review of remand on abstention principles); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 354-55 (1988) (holding discretionary remand of pendent jurisdiction
claim outside § 1447(c) is not subject to § 1447(d)).
174. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (concluding remand not for lack of jurisdiction and not subject to § 1447(d)).
175. See United Investors, 360 F.3d at 967 (concluding remand order under
SLUSA governed by § 1447(d); Spielman, 332 F.3d at 127 (same).
176. For a discussion of when removal is proper under SLUSA, see infra notes
177-91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how SLUSA preemption creates subject matter jurisdiction, see infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of SLUSA's removal provision and its intricacies, see
supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
178. Kircher,373 F.3d at 849 (illustrating example of improper removal when
number requirement of fifty class members for covered class action is not met).
179. See id. (discussing improper removal example). Judge Easterbrook concluded removal was proper even though the district court concluded the action
was not in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. See id. ("Removal of this suit was proper .... ").
180. See United Investors, 360 F.3d at 965 (stating defendant "only needed to
show that United Investors's action qualifies as a 'covered class action"').
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preemption test at issue.' 8 1 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district
182
court remanded the action because it was not a covered class action.
Although this removal mirrors Judge Easterbrook's example of improper
removal, he criticized the Ninth Circuit's holding that § 1447(d) bars review.' 8 3 Judge Easterbrook stated that the Ninth Circuit was "mesmerized
by the word 'jurisdiction' and did not see the difference between a case
that never should have been removed and a case properly removed and
remanded only when the federal job is done."1 84 This criticism is inconsistent with Judge Easterbrook's own example of improper removal, and
weakens his basis for using the "covered class action" requirement as the
185
sole factor for determining proper removal.
A correct reading of SLUSA's removal provision links proper removal
to satisfying SLUSA's four-part preemption test. 186 First, SLUSA's removal
provision is inextricably tied to its preemption test. 18 7 Therefore, an action is removable under SLUSA only if the action satisfies the four-part
preemption test discussed earlier.1 8 8 Proper removal is not determined by
189
being a covered class action as Judge Easterbrook recommends.
181. See id. at 964-65 (noting that parties agree on three parts of preemption
test and covered class action requirement is at issue).
182. See id. at 966 (noting district court rejected defendant's SLUSA preemption argument and remanded case).
183. See Kircher,373 F.3d at 849 (noting that Seventh Circuit's decision is creating split between Ninth and Second Circuits).
184. See id. at 850 (criticizing Ninth Circuit). This criticism emphasized the
holdings in Kontrick and Scarborough. See id. (commenting that Second and Ninth
Circuits did not reference Kontrick and Scarborough). For a full discussion of the
use of Kontrick and Scarborough in the Seventh Circuit's analysis, see supra note 157
and accompanying text. Kontrick and Scarborough involved claim processing rules
that are distinguishable from SLUSA. See Scarborough v. Principi, 124 S. Ct. 1856,
1864 (2004) (holding that claim processing rules are not jurisdictional); Kontrick
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) (same). For a full discussion of the holdings in
Kontrick and Scarborough, see supra note 29.
185. Compare Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (linking proper removal to covered class
action requirement), with Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 332
F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating removal is improper when four-part preemption test is not met).
186. For a discussion of SLUSA's removal provision and its connection to the
four-part preemption test, see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
77
p(c) (2004) ("Any cov187. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. §
ered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth
in [the preemption provision] shall be removable .... ") (emphasis added); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(2) (2004) (same); see
also Winne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 315 F. Supp. 2d
404, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that "the removal and [preemption] provisions
of SLUSA are intertwined").
188. See Herndon v. Equitable Variable Life Ins. Co., 325 F.3d 1252, 1253
(11th Cir. 2003) (stating four-part test required for removal); Riley v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (same);
O'Hare, supra note 14, at 28 n.82 ("This four part [removal] test is identical to the
test used to determine whether the state action should be preempted.").
189. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 849 (stating "conclusion that a suit is not a 'covered class action' . . . would imply that removal had been improper").
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Rather, the appropriateness of removal is linked to satisfying the four-part
preemption test.190 Therefore, when the district court in Kircher concluded that the plaintiff did not allege a loss in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, the district judge concluded removal was
improper and § 1447(d) would bar review of the required remand
order. 19 1
b.

Application of SLUSA Preemption Determines Existence of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction

The only way for a district court to have subject matter jurisdiction
over an action like Spielman, United Investors or Kircher is if SLUSA's preemption provision applies.' 9 2 All of the actions in these cases were filed in
state court and based on state law, and, therefore, fell outside the scope of
federal jurisdiction.' 93 Congress enacted SLUSA because plaintiffs were
filing in state court to evade the burdens of the PSLRA. 19 4 Normally, a
defendant could only remove a case to federal court if the court would
190. See Prager v. Knight/Trimark Group, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 229, 231
(D.NJ. 2000) (explaining removing party must show four-part test was met). The
covered class action requirement is the first prong of the four-part test; if any other
parts of the test are not satisfied, removal is deemed improper. See Spielnan, 332
F.3d at 125 (noting that if SLUSA preemption test is not met, removal is
improper).
191. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, No. 03-CV-0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10327, *7 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2004) (stating holding). "[T]he Court finds
that Defendants have not met the fourth requirement for SLUSA preemption.
Plaintiff's claims are not claims 'in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."' Id. The district court concluded removal was improper and remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at *9 (rejecting proper
removal argument and ordering remand); see also Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (stating
only actions properly removed are unaffected by § 1447(d)). An action improperly removed "would come within § 1447(d)." See id. at 849 (stating remands following improper removal are subject to appellate bar).
192. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 847-48 (noting "plaintiffs filed suit in state court,
invoking state law alone"); United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc.,
360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he district court's subject matter jurisdiction depended entirely on SLUSA's preemptive scope."); Spielman, 332 F.3d at 126
("To state the obvious, federal question jurisdiction to proceed under SLUSA is
dependent on SLUSA's applicability.").
193. See United Investors, 360 F.3d at 962 (describing action filed in California
state court based on state law); Spielman, 332 F.3d at 120 (noting suit brought in
New York state court and based solely on state law); Abada v. Charles Schwab &
Co., 300 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Kircher, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10327, at *2-3 (stating suit brought in Illinois state court and based on state law
claims of breach of fiduciary duty). A plaintiff is empowered to do this because, as
master of the complaint, the plaintiff can construct the complaint to avoid the
federal system. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)
("[P]laintiff [is] the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction
by exclusive reliance on state law.").
194. For a discussion of the congressional intent for SLUSA, see supra notes
106-07 and accompanying text.
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have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 195 A plaintiff structuring
his complaint solely on state law, therefore, would be safe from the federal
system. 19 6 SLUSA's preemption and removal provisions, however, provide
a defendant with a way to avoid the restrictions of the well-pleaded com97
plaint rule.'
While the rules may be altered under SLUSA, the underlying requirement that a district court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a removed action still exists. 198 Preemption is normally an affirmative defense
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2004) ("any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have originaljurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants") (emphasis added); Caterpillar,482
U.S. at 392 ("Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant."). The well-pleaded
complaint rule ensures that the defendant cannot use a federal defense as a
ground for removal to federal court. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986) ('jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that
the plaintiff has not advanced."); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 153-54 (1908) (holding defense based on federal law does not provide
basis for invoking federal jurisdiction). For a discussion of the well-pleaded complaint rule and its control on federal jurisdiction, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
196. See Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 399 (stating that "plaintiff may, by eschewing
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court").
197. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848 (noting SLUSA's removal provision permits
defendant to remove on defense of preemption).
The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, but it does not provide grounds for subject matter jurisdiction under
SLUSA. See O'Hare, supra note 14, at 73-76 (concluding that complete preemption doctrine does not apply to SLUSA). In Spielman, the Second Circuit analyzed
SLUSA in terms of the complete preemption doctrine. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at
124 (stating SLUSA completely preempts certain securities class actions). For a
further discussion of the Spielman court's application of complete preemption to
SLUSA, see supra note 133 and accompanying text. Although the Second Circuit
used the term "complete preemption," it stated that only a subset of securities
fraud actions are completely preempted. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 123 (stating
SLUSA's preemption provision determines which claims are completely preempted). Complete preemption, however, is only applicable when the federal
cause of action is intended to be the exclusive cause of action. See Beneficial Nat'l
Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5 (2003) (stating "proper inquiry focuses on
whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive"). All state
securities class actions that fall outside the preemptive scope of SLUSA must be
remanded to state court. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(d)(4), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77p(d) (4) (2004) (requiring remand for actions not covered by SLUSA's preemptive scope); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §28(f)(3)(D), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (3) (D) (2004) (same). Therefore, despite the Second Circuit's intermingling of SLUSA and complete preemption, they should be treated separately. See
O'Hare, supra note 14, at 75 (noting that "SLUSA does not trigger the complete
preemption doctrine"). SLUSA's four-part preemption test is what creates subject
matter jurisdiction over the state law claim in district court, and not the complete
preemption doctrine. See id. (concluding that complete preemption does not affect SLUSA preemption).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (stating district court is required to have original
jurisdiction for removal).
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that does not permit removal by the defendant. 9 9 SLUSA permits a defendant to remove to federal court based on a preemption defense and
have a district judge evaluate it. 20 0 If the defendant cannot establish that
the four-part SLUSA preemption test is met, the district judge is left with
no grounds for subject matter jurisdiction and must remand. 20 1 Therefore, despite SLUSA altering the well-pleaded complaint rule in the defendant's favor, a defendant is still bound to prove that a federal district court
has subject matter jurisdiction through SLUSA preemption. 20 2 In determining whether SLUSA preemption applies, the district judge is, in essence, deciding whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
20 3
the action.
3.

Substantive Issue Exception Is Not Applicable

The substantive issue exception derived from the Waco and Pelleport
decisions does not apply to remand orders under SLUSA. 20 4 The excep199. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) ("Federal preemption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit. As a defense, it does
not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court.") (citation omitted); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (stating under well-pleaded complaint rule action may not be removed "on the basis of a federal defense, including
the defense of pre-emption"); Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848 (citing FranchiseTax Bd., 463
U.S. at 1) ("Preemption normally is an affirmative defense, to be evaluated by the
court in which the plaintiff elects to sue.").
200. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (setting forth
SLUSA removal provision); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (2) (same); see also Kircher, 373 F.3d at 848 ("SLUSA departs from the
norm by permitting defendants to remove so that a federal court may evaluate the
defense in advance of any step in the state litigation.").
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4) ("[I]f the Federal court determines that the
action may be maintained in State court ... the Federal court shall remand such
action to such State court."); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (3) (D) (same).
202. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960,
966 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[I]n order to establish jurisdiction over [the defendant's]
motion to dismiss, the district court would have had to decide [the defendant's]
SLUSA preemption claim in its favor.") (citation omitted); Spielman, 332 F.3d at
124 (noting defendants may remove state securities class actions); see also Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, No. 03-CV-0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10327, *4 (S.D.
Ill. Jan. 27, 2004) (noting removing party carries burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction exists).
203. See United Investors, 360 F.3d at 966 (" [T] he district court's subject matter
jurisdiction depended entirely on SLUSA's preemptive scope .... "); Spielman, 332
F.3d at 126 ("To state the obvious, federal question jurisdiction to proceed under
SLUSA is dependent on SLUSA's applicability.... If a claim falls within SLUSA's
preemptive scope, by definition, it satisfies SLUSA's substantive requirements necessary to sustain removal.") (citation omitted); Adaba v. Charles Schwab & Co.,
Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) ("construction of SLUSA was necessary
for the resolution of subject matter jurisdiction"). But see Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850
(holding conclusion that SLUSA preemption does not apply is not tantamount to
lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
204. See Spielman, 332 F.3d at 129 (holding that Pelleport/Clorox exception
"would not create appellate jurisdiction"); Abada, 300 F.3d at 1119 ("Because con-
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tion only applies to substantive issues that are independent of subject matter jurisdiction.2 0 While applying the SLUSA preemption test may be
considered substantive, the district court's subject matter jurisdiction is
tied to the four-part preemption test. 20 6 Notably, the Ninth Circuit, which
generated the substantive issue exception, has found it does not apply to
20 7
permit review of remand orders under SLUSA.
B.

The Need for Appellate Review

Federal courts have struggled in determining which state law claims
are preempted by SLUSA. 20 8 It is critical for courts to decide the issue
correctly because of the impact preemption has on the course of the litigation. 20 9 In Kircher,Judge Easterbrook highlighted the need for appellate
review in this area to "promote accurate and consistent implementation of
[SLUSA] .,210

Appellate review of remand orders is not available because of the
§ 1447(d) bar. 21 1 The creation of another judicial exception to § 1447(d)
struction of SLUSA was necessary for the resolution of subject matter jurisdiction,
the Clorox/Pelleport exception does not apply to create appellate jurisdiction.").
205. See Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that Pelleport exception does not apply when substantive issue is not
apart from jurisdiction). For a full discussion of the substantive issue exception,
see supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of how SLUSA's four-part test determines the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, see supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
207. See Abada, 300 F.3d at 1118 (holding "Clorox/Pelleportexception does not
apply" to remand under SLUSA); see also Spielman, 332 F.3d at 129-30 (finding it

persuasive that Ninth Circuit found Pelleport did not apply to SLUSA remand).
208. See Magyery v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 954, 959
(N.D. Ind. 2004) ("The district court cases appear to be all over the map on the
issue of what state law claims are preempted by SLUSA."). The confusion centers
on how to interpret the four-part preemption test, especially the "in connection
with" requirement. See O'Hare, supra note 14, at 82 (stating "in connection with"
requirement is to be interpreted identically to Rule 1Ob-5 of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934). The problem is Rule lOb-5's "in connection with requirement" is
"difficult to apply, to say the least." See id. (explaining interpretive difficulties with
"in connection with").
209. See Kircher v. Putman Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 848 (7th Cir. 2004) ("If
the federal court determines that the claim is preempted, it dismisses the suit;
otherwise it remands for proceedings under state law."); see also Securities Act of
1933 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4) (2004) (requiring remand if SLUSA preemption does not apply); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(f) (3) (D), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(f) (3) (D) (2004) (same). The protections of the PSLRA are not applicable
in state court and the defendant may be more likely to settle the suit than face
costly litigation. See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101,
108-09 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing benefit for plaintiff to file in state court and
avoid heightened pleading requirements applicable in federal court).
210. See Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (noting that if "the remand is deemed nonappealable, then a major substantive issue in the case will escape review").
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2004) (prohibiting appellate review of remand
orders).
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would frustrate the strong congressional bias against review of remand orders. 2 12 This congressional policy against remand review ensures fairness
to the litigants by preventing delay. 213 Section 1447(d) is straightforward
in its limit on review of remand orders, but the doctrine is complicated by
the numerous judicially manufactured exceptions. 214 SLUSA remand orders are clearly governed by § 1447(d) and none of the present exceptions
are applicable. 215 Therefore, in order to preserve the strong congressional policy against review of remand orders, the § 1447(d) bar on appellate review must not be devalued by another judicially created
216
exception.
212. See Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing "strong congressional policy against review of remand orders"). "Congress'
purpose in barring review of all remand orders has always been very clear-to
prevent the additional delay which a removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsideration of an order of remand." Therntron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 354 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Solimine,
supra note 46, at 289 (noting effects of judicial exceptions on § 1447(d) bar).
"The evisceration of the bar of Section 1447(d) initiated by Thermtron continues to
have an impressive and largely unreviewed ripple effect in the doctrine of lower
federal courts." Id.
213. See United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1946) (stating purpose
for adoption of statutory provision that barred appellate review).
established the policy
Congress, by the adoption of these provisions ....
of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed
cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district
court to which the cause is removed. This was accomplished by denying
any form of review of an order of remand ....
Id. at 751.
214. See Solimine, supra note 46, at 333 (noting that judicial interpretation of
§ 1447(d) is "largely unsatisfactory, as it departs without good reason from the
relatively clear meaning of the bar to appellate review found in that statute"). Despite the clear language of § 1447(d), "the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have concluded that [§] 1447(d) does not mean precisely what it says in all
cases." See Wasserman, supra note 46, at 108-09 (noting judicially created exceptions to statutory bar on review of remand orders); see also In re Amoco Petroleum
Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Thermtron holds that § 1447(d)
).
does not mean what it says ....
215. See Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.
2002) ("none of the relevant exceptions to the statutory prohibition of appellate
review of district court orders remanding complaints for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction applies"). For a discussion of the absence of an exception to the
§ 1447(d) bar on review of remand orders, see supra notes 163-92 and accompanying text.
216. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d
116, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding rejection of appellate review "aligns with Congress' intent and its aware [ness] of the universality of ... denying appellate review
of remand orders") (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). In Spielman, the
Second Circuit rejected the defendant's argument to construe a new exception to
the § 1447(d) bar by drawing on SLUSA's silence regarding appellate jurisdiction.
See id. (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991)) (stating "[i]t is
not our place as jurists to supply that which is omitted by the legislature"). Some
commentators have called for Congress to address the review of remand orders
and provide clearer language. See, e.g., Hrdlick, supra note 46, at 579 ("It is time
for Congress to revisit the question of appellate review of remand orders in re-
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Appellate review of dismissal orders under SLUSA, on the other
hand, is permitted because the language of § 1447(d) does not govern
these orders7' 7 A dismissal order under SLUSA is a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.218 Numerous cases reach appellate courts
when a plaintiff appeals a district court's determination that SLUSA
preempts the state action. 2 19 When a district judge finds SLUSA preemption, the district court must dismiss the plaintiffs action. 220 Upon dismissal, the plaintiff may either refile the action in federal court by omitting
any state law claims or appeal the dismissal order. 221 When the plaintiff
appeals the dismissal, a court of appeals is able to review whether the dis2 22
trict judge correctly applied the four-part preemption test.
Consistent and accurate implementation of SLUSA will be attained
through the establishment of clear guidelines derived from appellate review of dismissal orders. 22 3 This appellate review will provide the necessary precedent for district courts to follow in applying the four-part
moved causes, and then to legislate-more clearly and forcefully-its decision on
the matter."); Solimine, supra note 46, at 290 (recommending solution of
"amend [ing] the relevant statutes, rather than torture their language via doctrinal
interpretation"); Wasserman, supranote 46, at 130 ("That the clear language of the
statute no longer correctly states the law is reason enough for amending the statute.") (footnote omitted).
217. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2004) (stating only remand orders are not reviewable on appeal).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004) ("The courts of appeals (other than the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... "); see
also Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1096 (11th Cir. 2002) (reviewing and
affirming district court finding of SLUSA preemption and dismissal); Currie v. Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill., 859 F.2d 1538, 1540 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding order
dismissing on preemption grounds was final and appealable).
219. For a discussion of the cases that reach the courts of appeals and the
nature of the review, see infra note 222.
220. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2004) (stating
action may not be maintained if preemption applies); Securities Act of 1934 § 28
(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2004) (same).
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (omitting federal law claims from those preempted under SLUSA); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (same); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(permitting appeal of dismissal as final decision of district court).
222. See Patenaude v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 290 F.3d 1020, 1023
(9th Cir. 2002) (stating issue on appeal is whether district court properly applied
SLUSA preemption). Many of the cases on appeal evaluate certain aspects of the
SLUSA four-part preemption test. See, e.g., Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d
875, 878 (8th Cir. 2002) (reviewing preemption grounds for dismissal order and
affirming on ground that tax-deferred annuities are covered securities); Riley v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1346-47 (11th Cir.
2002) (concluding SLUSA preempts misrepresentation cases that lack scienter and
affirming dismissal); Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 120
(2d Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal by finding variable annuities are within scope
of SLUSA).
223. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004)
(commenting that appellate review will provide means for accurate and consistent
implementation of SLUSA preemption).
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preemption test. 224 Because SLUSA was only enacted in 1998, many as-

pects of SLUSA preemption have not been fully litigated. 225 Over time,
more dismissals will be appealed, and appellate courts will be able to provide workable guidelines for district courts. 226 The result will be consistent and accurate application of SLUSA preemption without undermining
227
the strong congressional policy against review of remand orders.

VI.

CONCLUSION

228
District courts are struggling with the scope of SLUSA preemption.

Private securities class actions are predicted to increase in the coming
years as a result of corporate governance legislation and accounting rule
changes. 229 The judicial interpretation of SLUSA's preemption provision
will be crucial in managing this increased securities litigation. 23 0 Appellate review of remand orders, however, is not available to ensure consistency and accuracy of the district courts' application of SLUSA. 23 1 First,
the § 1447(d) bar on review of remand orders is applicable to remand
orders under SLUSA's remand provision. 232 Second, there is no statutory
or judicially created exception that permits review of SLUSA remand orders. 233 Finally, a new exception should not be created because it defeats
224. See Patenaude, 290 F.3d at 1023 (evaluating district court's application of
SLUSA preemption).
225. See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Chellgren, No. Civ. A 02-220-DLB,
2004 WL 1348880, at *15 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2004) ("SLUSA is fairly new legislation, the application of which is still being determined by the courts."). For a
discussion of how courts are struggling to interpret SLUSA's preemption provision, see supra note 208 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of the circuit court decisions that provide precedent for
the application of SLUSA's four-part preemption test, see supra note 222.
227. Compare Kircher,373 F.3d at 850 (presenting benefits of appellate review),
with Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 127 (2d
Cir. 2003) (concluding that appellate review of remand orders would eviscerate
§ 1447(d) bar).
228. See Magyery v. Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 954, 959
(N.D. Ind. 2004) ("The district court cases appear to be all over the map on the
issue of what state law claims are preempted by SLUSA.").
229. Compare PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 3 (stating increase
in securities litigation is expected due to Sarbanes-Oxley and new accounting rules
from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
supra note 15, at 3 (theorizing about whether new class of securities actions will
develop in future).
230. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (explaining need for
SLUSA to manage private securities litigation).
231. See Kircher,373 F.3d at 850 (commenting that SLUSA preemption is major issue in course of litigation). For a discussion of the need to avoid another
judicially created exception, see supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
232. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995)
(holding § 1447(d) applies to removal and remand under any statute).
233. See Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d
116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting there is no express statutory exception in SLUSA
for appellate review of remand orders); Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., 300
F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding nojudicial exception permits review).
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NOTE

234
Apthe congressional intent to bar appellate review of remand orders.
pellate review of SLUSA preemption is needed for consistency and accuracy, but that need is satisfied when a plaintiff appeals a dismissal order
2 35
under SLUSA to a circuit court.

Thomas F. Lamprecht

234. See Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting
"strong congressional policy against [appellate] review of remand orders" in
§ 1447(d) (quoting Sykes v. Tex. Air Corp., 834 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1987))).
235. For a discussion of how cases dismissed under SLUSA provide the opportunity for circuit courts to review the district court determination, see supra note
217-22 and accompanying text.
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